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Last month, during routine scanning of cargo at the Heathrow Airport, the British police came across a “very small quantity of uranium “package. The undeclared material was discovered on a passenger flight on December 29, 2022. The Indian news agencies and Daily Mail Online reported “it was destined for an Iranian business with premises in the UK (David Barret, Home Affairs Editor for the Daily Mail and Brittany Chain for Mail Online, Published January 10, 2023). Being “not of weapon grade” the uranium was incapable of being used for improvising a “dirty bomb” (a radiation dispersal device). However, some news agencies and uncanny experts tried to whip up “dirty bomb” scare out of the incident. Hamish De Bretton-Gordon, former commander of the UK’s nuclear defence regiment lent credence to the unfounded scare. He said: ‘Uranium can give off very high levels of poisonous radiation. It could be used in a dirty bomb. Indian news agencies and the Daily Mail Online, in their reports, magnified “a very small quantity” into “several kilograms” of uranium. It was claimed that the package “originated” in Pakistan though it was headed for an Iranian business in Britain.
British Police Commander, Richard Smith clarified: ‘I want to reassure the public that the amount of contaminated material was extremely small and has been assessed by experts as posing no threat to the public. ‘Although our investigation remains ongoing, from our inquiries so far, it does not appear to be linked to any direct threat.
‘As the public would expect, however, we will continue to follow up on all available lines of enquiry to ensure this is definitely the case.
‘However, it does highlight the excellent capability we and our partners have in place to monitor our ports and borders in order to keep the public safe from any potential threats to their safety and security that might be coming into the UK.’ ‘The material has been identified as being contaminated with uranium.’
Distortion
It is unfortunate that India in cahoots with some foreign media is always in the forefront to exploit such incidents and portray Pakistan as a nuclear rogue. For instance, Time magazine, in its article ‘Merchant of Menace’, reported some uranium hexa-flouride cylinders were missing from the Kahuta Research Laboratories (February 15, 2005). Pakistan’ information minister and foreign-office spokesman both refuted the allegation. The information minister told Geo TV channel, “We have checked all the records and no cylinder is missing from the KRL”. Masood Khan (foreign office) told reporters, “The story is a rehash of several past stories”. May read N-Terror Threat the News International, August 27, 2009
India’s own record is dismal. Let us reminisce a few incidents It is not understood why loss of radioactive material from Indian labs is always out of the magazine’s focus _ According to international media reports (February 25, 2004),
India itself reported 25 cases of “missing” or “stolen” radio-active material from its labs to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Fifty-two per cent of the cases were attributed to “theft” and 48% to “missing mystery”. India claimed to have recovered lost material in twelve of total 25 cases. She however admitted that 13 remaining cases remained mysterious.
Pot calling kettle black:India’s radio-active bazaar
India has a sprawling civil and military nuclear programme that spreads over several states. In an article in The Diplomat, Sitara Noor highlighted shortcomings in safety and security of India’s nuclear facilities (India’s radio-active bazaar: Recurring incidents involving theft and sale of nuclear materials demonstrate why India must develop an independent nuclear regulatory body.)
<thediplomat.com/2022/03/India’s radio-active bazaar> [Accessed 14 January 2023].
She says: ‘While global markets are taking a dip due to economic recession, India’s illicit uranium market seems to be flourishing. In February, eight people including two Indian officials were apprehended in Nepal for illegally possessing and attempting to sell“uranium like substance”. The material was reportedly smuggled from India. This was not just one-off incident _ theft and sale of nuclear and radioactive material in India is a recurring phenomenon. Earlier in May 2021, reports of the seizure of 7 kilograms of highly radio-active uranium worth 210 million Indian rupees from a scrap dealer raised serious concern about India’s nuclear security capabilities. Over the past two decades over 200 kilograms of nuclear and radio-active materials has reportedly disappeared from Indian facilities. Frequent incidents of loss and theft of nuclear and radio-active materials in India indicate the failure of the nuclear security systems at multiple levels. First there seems to be a gap in the material accounting and control systems to ensure that not even an iota of material is left unaccounted. Second, the nature of incidents in India hints at the involvement of insiders_ someone working at the nuclear facilities or mining sites working independently or colluding with an outsider. This indicates the serious risk of insider threat and a failure of the personnel reliability program. Third, the recurrence of nuclear security lapses with such impunity indicates serious issues with nuclear security culture in India…’
Is Dirty bomb a hoax?
Opinion about the effects of a dirty bomb is divided.
A report by Henry Stimson Center, Washington (followed by several other reports) laments “…Nuclear and radiological terrorism remains a frightening possibility in India and Pakistan, and the source material for nuclear terrorism could come from illicit transactions of poorly protected materials originating outside the region, as well as material from within the region used for military or civilian purposes”.
This report was provided to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee to facilitate the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
The report concludes that “although India and Pakistan have established regulatory bodies to deal with the safety and security of their nuclear materials,’ these may not be sufficient to protect against every potential threat”.
Another report, authored by Kishore Kuchibhotla, Ph.D (Biophysics) from Harvard, and Matthew McKinzie, a nuclear physicist serving as a staff scientist with USA’s Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council, argues that “…three other types of events could prompt unintended escalation in South Asia: a terrorist use of RDDs (radiological dispersal devices); a terrorist detonation of a nuclear weapon; and the accidental explosion of nuclear arms — for example at military bases in either India or Pakistan… The report points out that while nuclear weapons themselves are closely guarded, all sorts of radioactive material could be found in research laboratories and hospitals that could provide the basic materials for the making of a dirty bomb…. Nearly 10,000 radioactive sources are used throughout India of which about 400 are particularly worrisome…” The report predicts that “…dirty bomb detonation in Karachi, New Delhi, Mumbai and Islamabad” could result in “casualties that at the very minimum would number in the tens of thousands”. It is eerie to note that The Time (Pentagon) correspondent Mark Thompson asserts in his article what is a ‘Dirty Bomb, “It’s unlikely to kill 10,000 people”.)
It appears that the concern about the “dirty bombs” is overblown. History of terrorism reflects that “terrorists” are interested in symbolic targets (which could yield widespread publicity), not in mass killing (vide Verindre Grover’s Encyclopaedia of International Terrorism).
A “dirty bomb” is not known to have been tested by any country or detonated by any “terrorist” anywhere in the world. So, its composition and scope of its destructive power is shrouded in mystery. However, it is generally believed to “consist of a bomb made of conventional explosives such as TNT, salted with radioactive material”.
Contrary to the “dirty bombs”, fall-out of the tested A-bombs is well recorded. The major powers declared moratoriums on nuclear-bombs testing only in 1992. The pre-1992-period test scoreboard of the USA, former Soviet Union, France, and Britain is an explosion every 18 days, 21 days, 61 days, and 331 days (R Venkataraman Nuclear Explosion and its Aftermath).
CBW
It is much easier and cheaper to make a chemical or biological bomb than a “dirty bomb” (It is believed that the chemical bombs used by Saddam’s Iraq against Iran were made with Indian know-how). Though a “dirty bomb” has never been used by any “terrorist”, a bio/chemical bomb was actually used by Japan’s former doomsday-cult Guru Shoko Asahara. The Guru stands sentenced to death “for masterminding the deadly 1995 nerve/chemical gas (sarin) attack on the Tokyo subway and a string of other crimes that killed 27 people”.
The cult’s quest for biological weapons was overshadowed by its chemical attack capability. The cult members were trying to develop botulinum toxin by utilising toxin of green Mamba snake and poisonous mushroom spores,
Regarding use of chemical/biological weapons by “terrorists”, Professor Ramesh Chandra points out in his Global Terrorism (volume 1, page 27), “The US government indicates that these weapons are well within the reach of terrorists. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons is not surprising, given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be produced in simple laboratories… Although popular fiction and national attention have focused on terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons are more likely choices for such groups’”.
Not only sarin, but also several other chemical agents like mustard, tabun, soman and VX are capable of dual use as pesticides and as a chemical weapon. Chandra (op. cit., page 30) points out, “chemical warfare agents ‘can quite literally be manufactured in a kitchen or basement in quantities sufficient for mass-casualty attacks”. Experts agree that it is more difficult to manufacture Sarin gas, used by the “terrorists” in Japan, than mustard, tabun, soman, et al. To some experts, an effective bio-terrorism facility could be built at $ 200,000 to 2 million.
Biological weapons, too, are easier to manufacture than “dirty bombs”. Viruses could cause smallpox, Venezuelan equine encephalitis and hemorrhagic fevers like Ebola. The threat of biological weapons is obvious from the fact that: (1) The charges for anthrax, Q fever (Coxiella burnetti) and Venezuelian equine encephalomyeletus cultures from a leading US culture collection are about $ 45, $ 80, and $81 respectively. Besides, nature abounds with microscopic killers. Bacillus anthracis resides in hides and carcasses of wild or domesticated animals and plagues in prairie dogs, chipmunks, black rats, deer mouse and coyotes. Chandra (op cit) states that “The cost estimates for a bio-terrorism facility vary quite widely from $ 200,000 to $ 2 million…Instructions for how to mass produce, purify, and concentrate microbes can be found in textbooks and scientific journals”.
Concluding reflections
The Heathrow nuclear material is now seen as ‘deadly’ but the UK-based media agency reported that the uranium was ‘not weapons-grade’ – and so could not be used to manufacture a thermo-nuclear weapon, as per sources.
It appears that disproportionate emphasis on mythical “dirty bombs” vis-à-vis chemical / bio- bombs is meant to press and exploit non-major or nuclear-threshold states. “Dirty” or clean bomb attacks by “terrorists” need to be understood and explained within the broader frame of “terrorism”.
The US authorities have recorded over 175 cases worldwide of nuclear materials (not bombs) being smuggled out of former Soviet Union territories and other countries. The Federation of American Scientists, nevertheless, admits that “radiological attacks could result in some deaths but not hundreds of thousands of casualties that could be caused by a crude nuclear weapon” .
The US scientist concluded, “Significant quantities of radioactive material have been lost or stolen from US facilities during the past few years. Radiological materials are stored in thousands of facilities around the US, many of which may not be adequately protected against theft by determined terrorists’ ‘. Materials like Iridium-192, Cobalt 60 (Gamma emitter), Cesium-137 (Gamma emitter), Americium (Alpha emitter) and even plutonium could still be stolen from over 21,000 laboratories, food irradiation plants, oil drilling facilities and medical centres in the USA. But, it is not an easy job to make an effective “dirty bomb”.
It appears that “dirty bomb” is a hoax to exploit nouveau-nuclear or nuclear-threshold nations. It could be a weapon of mass disruption, but not a weapon of mass destruction. Real threat emanates from chemical or bio-weapons.
The Curious case of Estonian Cyber Capabilities: Lessons for Pakistan
Mr. Amjed Jaaved has been contributing free-lance for over five decades. His contributions stand published in the leading dailies at home and abroad (Nepal. Bangladesh, et. al.). He is author of seven e-books including Terrorism, Jihad, Nukes and other Issues in Focus (ISBN: 9781301505944). He holds degrees in economics, business administration, and law.
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in 2007, after the Russian Cyber-attacks, the Estonian government realizes the need for a proper cybersecurity policy and It launched its first cybersecurity policy in 2008. These policy rules were implemented in two different phases. The first phase was from 2009- 2011 and the second was from 2011-2013. A renewed strategy is adopted for the year 2019-2022. Estonia is among the few countries, that have incorporated cybersecurity in its national security domain. Government institutions had taken different measures to produce an active cyber force over the year. Estonia has unified Government agencies, private institutions, and even civil society to develop vigorous cybersecurity arrangements. Many Government and non-government institutions are grouped because it considers cybersecurity a great threat to national security. Estonia has a very efficient cyber command and control structure. The Ministry of Economic affairs and communication was given the main task to overlook all the issues related to cybersecurity. It is supervised by the government’s security committee and supported by different ministries.
What distinguishes Estonia from other countries is the fact that the public is playing a very effective role in making robust cybersecurity arrangements. The cyber defense league is a part of the defense league that works under the ministry of defense. Defense League is a volunteer organization of Estonian people that works closely with the ministry of defense to counter any kind of threat to the national security of Estonia. Cyber Defense League is a league of experts working under the supervision of MoD. Its main task is to prevent Estonia from high-level cyber-attacks. Its activities are divided into two broad categories. The first is to increase the capacity of the local population and government institutions against cyber-attacks. The second is to carry out different operations in the field of cyberspace.
Estonia is considered among the smaller states in the world. It does not have a huge population and area. Furthermore, its small military forces and resource are less prominent than major powers. But in the field of Information and communication technology, Estonia has transformed itself into a major power and now acting as a role model for many in the world. Estonia is collaborating very effectively with other states and international organizations. This collaboration not only increased Estonian cyber capabilities, but it is also useful for other parties to learn from the experience of Estonia. The most important partnership of Estonia is with NATO member states. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence a premier institution to deal with cybersecurity threats is situated in Tallinn. This department has the tasks of capacity building, policy coordination, and forming a joint effective force to deal with the threat of cyber-attacks. An important agency of the European Union is also located in Tallinn. Its name is EU-LISA. Its main role is handling Information technology systems.
In comparison with major international actors, smaller states are always considered vulnerable to attack. But cyberspace gives a huge advantage to smaller states in case of conflict with major powers thus they can deal with conventional asymmetry by using cyber force. Estonia is among the very first countries that have developed a proper cybersecurity policy. It showed the world how a tiny state can play a leading role in the field of cybersecurity. Estonia is playing a leading role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for strengthening cybersecurity infrastructure.
In the word of Thomas Waite, “we’ve gone from the Cold War to the Code War”. Pakistan as a member of the international community and with its own interest in International Politics could not Isolate itself from the effects of “code war”. Therefore, it is high time for Pakistan to learn from the states like Estonia to draft a proper mechanism to deal with the threat of Cyberwar.
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With the rise of technology, the nature of crime has also transformed. Crime becomes more lethal and untraceable. Cyber security expert warns about the new nature and domain of cybercrime in 2023.
Cyber Attack on Hospital
Cyber-attacks on hospital systems can have serious consequences, as they can disrupt the delivery of healthcare and potentially put patients’ lives at risk. Hospitals are often targeted by cybercriminals because they may have valuable personal and financial information about patients and because the consequences of a successful attack can be severe.
In a cyber-attack on a hospital system, the attacker may try to gain unauthorized access to the hospital’s computer systems and steal or manipulate data, disrupt the operation of medical devices, or disrupt the delivery of healthcare. The attack may also involve ransomware, where the attacker holds the hospital’s data hostage and demands a ransom to restore access.
It is important for hospitals to have strong cybersecurity measures in place to protect against cyber-attacks. This may include measures such as firewalls, antivirus software, and secure passwords, as well as ongoing training for staff on how to recognize and prevent cyber-attacks.
Scanning QR Code
Scanning a QR code has the potential to compromise your personal data if the QR code is linked to a malicious website or if it is used to steal your personal information. It’s important to be cautious when scanning QR codes, especially if they are from unfamiliar sources.
It’s also a good practice to check the URL of the website that the QR code leads to, to make sure it is a legitimate website and not a phishing site or other type of scam.
It’s also a good idea to use a QR code scanner app that checks for safety and has some sort of building security checks, also updating your device and QR scanner app on regular basis will make sure you have the latest security patches.
It’s a good practice to avoid scanning QR codes from untrusted sources and only scan QR codes from sources that you know and trust.
Cyber-attack on Supply Line
A cyber-attack on a supply chain can have significant consequences for the affected organizations and their customers. These types of attacks can disrupt the flow of goods and services, leading to delays, lost revenue, and potentially even damage to a company’s reputation.
In a supply chain cyber-attack, attackers typically target the systems and networks that companies use to manage and track their inventory, orders, and shipments. For example, an attacker might target a company’s enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, which is used to manage inventory and production, or a transportation management system (TMS), which is used to track shipments and deliveries.
The attacker can gain access to these systems through a variety of methods, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in software, phishing scams, or other forms of social engineering. Once they have access, they can steal sensitive information such as customer data, financial data, and intellectual property, or disrupt the normal operation of these systems. This can lead to delays in deliveries, stakeouts, and unplanned downtime in production.
It’s important for organizations to take steps to protect their supply chains from cyber-attacks, by implementing measures such as security awareness training for employees, regular security audits and penetration testing, and the use of advanced security technologies such as firewalls, intrusion detection, and prevention systems, and security information and event management (SIEM) tools.
In addition, organizations should also be proactive in monitoring for signs of an attack and be ready with incident response plans, which can help minimize the damage of a successful attack and help with a faster recovery.
Cyber-attack on electric cars/vehicle
A cyber-attack on an electric vehicle (EV) can have serious consequences, potentially compromising the safety and privacy of the vehicle’s occupants, as well as the integrity of the EV’s systems and networks.
One way that attackers may target an EV is by exploiting vulnerabilities in the vehicle’s electronic control units (ECUs), which are the computer systems that control various aspects of the vehicle, such as the powertrain, brakes, and steering. Attackers could potentially take control of these systems and manipulate the vehicle’s behavior, potentially causing accidents or other dangerous situations.
Another way attackers may target an EV is by exploiting vulnerabilities in the vehicle’s communication systems, such as the onboard diagnostics (OBD) port, or wireless connectivity systems, such as Bluetooth or cellular networks. This can allow attackers to gain access to the vehicle’s systems and data and potentially steal sensitive information such as location data, driving history, and personal information of the occupants.
To mitigate the risk of cyber-attacks on EVs, it’s important for manufacturers to design and build vehicles with security in mind. This includes the use of secure coding practices, regular software updates to address known vulnerabilities, and the use of robust security protocols to protect the vehicle’s communication systems.
It’s also important for EV owners to be aware of the risks and take steps to protect their vehicles. This can include keeping their vehicles’ software up to date, being cautious about connecting their vehicles to unfamiliar networks or devices, and not leaving sensitive information such as personal data in the vehicle.
As the trend of Electric cars is getting more popular and advancement in technology is increasing, Cybersecurity in Electric cars will be a crucial area to ensure the safety and security of both vehicles and their occupants.
Cyber-attack on Electric Grid
A cyber-attack on an electric grid can have serious consequences, potentially causing widespread power outages and disruptions to the electricity supply. Electric grids are complex systems that rely on many interconnected components, including power generators, transmission and distribution systems, and control systems.
One way that attackers may target an electric grid is by exploiting vulnerabilities in the control systems, such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and other industrial control systems (ICS) that are used to monitor and control the grid. Attackers can use malware, phishing scams, or other techniques to gain access to these systems and manipulate the grid’s behavior, potentially causing power outages or other disruptions to the electricity supply.
Another way that attackers may target an electric grid is by exploiting vulnerabilities in the communications systems that are used to transmit data and control signals between different parts of the grid. This could include exploiting vulnerabilities in the networks that connect power plants, substations, and other grid components, or by targeting the systems used to manage the grid’s transmission and distribution systems.
To mitigate the risks of cyber-attacks on electric grids, it’s important for utilities and grid operators to take a proactive approach to cybersecurity. This includes implementing robust security measures such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and security information and event management (SIEM) tools. Additionally, regular security audits, penetration testing, and employee training on cybersecurity are important.
It’s also important for government agencies, utilities, and grid operators to work together to share threat intelligence and coordinate incident response efforts. Furthermore, Industry Standards and regulations such as NIST-CIP, IEC62443, and others provide guidelines for protecting industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid.
Given the critical importance of electric grids to our daily lives, ensuring their cybersecurity is a vital step towards protecting our communities and infrastructure from potential cyber threats.
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Many peculiarities are coming out of this strange war as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine enters its eleventh month. The reason why a strong cyber warfare power like Russia has launched so few and hence ineffective cyber-attacks against Ukraine and its allies is one of the most perplexing. The digital conflict over Ukraine is examined by New Horizons, along with any potential long-term effects.
On February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, many analysts anticipated a conflict far different from the one that is currently being waged. Not only was the invasion expected to be a four-day blitzkrieg, but many experts predicted that Russia would wage such a fierce cyber war against Ukraine that an invasion might not even be necessary to force Kyiv to comply with Moscow’s demands. Even before Russian forces attacked Ukraine in February, many analysts in the West, Ukraine, and Russia predicted that Moscow might use cyber-attacks to cause significant harm to Ukraine before or after the military invasion began. Russia does have significant and formidable cyber capabilities. The reality, on the other hand, has been significantly different.
The offensive has stagnated and stretched into eleven months of brutal ground battle, but the cyber war has never actually taken off. This is unexpected because Russia, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Israel, Iran, and North Korea, has been building advanced offensive and defensive cybernetic capabilities for decades and has also indicated a willingness to employ them on numerous occasions.
Although these cyber operations may appear formidable, they not only fell far short of expectations but also turned out to be counterproductive. The Russian cyber war cost tens of millions of dollars in losses. It was disruptive and at times terrifying, but it never went beyond a series of practical jokes. And jokes have never triumphed in battle.
Over the past eleven months, it has been clear that very few, if any, of Russia’s cyber-attacks have been carried out in support of a definite military goal. Nothing that may have put genuine pressure on Ukraine to make concessions from the nation or its allies—such as attacks on naval control and command systems or attacks on crucial infrastructure—was present.
The war in Ukraine is the largest military conflict of the cyber age and the first to incorporate such significant levels of cyber operations on all sides. It may be that Ukrainian cyberspace proved to be much better protected than some thought. Or it may be that Russia did not use its offensive cyber capabilities because the Kremlin interfered in every aspect of the preparation for the war, from military planning to cyber activities. The Kremlin wanted the invasion to play out as a “special operation” (in the Kremlin’s words), not a conventional military offensive. In this, as in much else, the Kremlin greatly miscalculated.
The first attacks were carried out using wiper software, which erases the hard disks of infected devices. These were addressed by a variety of Ukrainian government, non-profit, and information technology groups. Whispergate ransomware was disguised as ransomware, but instead of permitting recovery, it acted when the infected device was temporarily turned down and then downloaded a malicious.exe file to delete targeted data. Another type of attack was the Gamaredon virus, which targeted Ukrainian and related targets all over the world.
Over 10,000 satellite internet modems that are a component of the American satellite company Viasat’s network in Ukraine, as well as other parts of Europe, were the target of a cyber-attack when Russian troops invaded on February 24. The attack, which was linked to Russia by the US, UK, and EU governments, was followed on March 1 by massive cyber-attacks on media outlets in Kyiv at the same time a missile hit Kyiv’s television tower.
In addition to these attacks, financial firms, border check stations, and even telecommunications infrastructure were targeted, leading banking services to be disrupted, power outages to occur, and the distribution of medications, food, and humanitarian supplies to be hampered. There were also phishing assaults on the government and military, as well as the discovery of monitoring software on numerous networks that took information about social media and financial transactions from the corporate and nongovernment residents. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks against telecommunications corporations were another prevalent type of assault.
Another aspect to consider is Ukraine’s cyber defenses. Russia has not attacked the country for the first time in 2022. Since the 2014 revolution that deposed the pro-Moscow administration, Ukraine has served as Russia’s digital test bed. This has turned Ukraine into Russia’s cyber playground, yet it has also pushed Ukraine into a testing ground for defenses.
Reliable reports are hard to come by due to the fog of war, but Ukraine has managed to repel Russian attacks, limit damage they caused, and even launch limited counterattacks. The internet in Ukraine is also much decentralized, and many of its resources are situated outside. In fact, creating a computer network that could continue to operate in the case of a full-scale nuclear strike was the entire objective of the internet. Commercial networks in Ukraine were fortified before the invasion, which has only increased their inherent robustness.
The fact that Ukraine still uses Cold War-era weaponry is one ironic aspect. In many ways, this is a drawback, but radar systems that use radio valves rather of microchips can be just as resistant to cyber-attack as a steam engine that burns coal.
The advent of the smartphone and other portable communications equipment with reliable encryption, on the other hand, makes the information war considerably more difficult to wage. Propaganda is easier to transmit today, but it is also quicker to counter, as shown in the West when phony documents were released in an election and were discredited in less than an hour.
Conclusion
Everyone was reminded of the importance of conventional warfare by the conflict in Ukraine. Many people believed that the use of tanks and other mechanized weapons in warfare had come to an end before Russia invaded Ukraine, and that future wars would be fought using computer software. However, both cyber-attacks and drones have been used in this conflict, and it appears that both will be used more frequently in wars to come. Software alone cannot currently guarantee a military campaign’s success. While this may sound very awful, warfare still necessitates men in steel, and this will likely continue to be the case for the near future. Hopefully, the messy nature of modern conflict, as proven by Ukraine, will serve as a warning to other nations.
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